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Sentimentality as an Aesthetic Flaw 
 
Severin Schroeder (University of Reading) 
 
 
 
 
What is — and what is wrong with — sentimentality in literature?  Over the last decades 
there have been a number of attempts to explain sentimentality in literature as, primarily, a 
moral defect.  On this account, if in literary criticism we disparage something as sentimental, a 
negative aesthetic evaluation (in a broad sense of the term ‘aesthetic’) is based on a moral 
judgement.  This would be an instance of the relevance of moral considerations for aesthetic 
criticism. 
 Current arguments for censuring literary sentimentality on moral grounds proceed in 
two steps (although the second one is often taken for granted): 
 First, sentimentality in a person is analysed as a moral failing. 
 Secondly, such moral censure of a person is then transferred to an artefact: a work of 
fiction. 
 I shall mainly be concerned with two such moralising accounts of literary 
sentimentality.  The first (I) goes back to a remark by Oscar Wilde that was picked up by 
Michael Tanner, Roger Scruton, and others.  The second (II) was propounded by Anthony 
Savile, and to some extent by Mary Midgley. 
 
 
I. 
The Oscar Wilde view.  In his long letter of accusation to his former lover Lord Alfred 
Douglas, written from Reading Prison and posthumously published under the title De 
Profundis, Oscar Wilde explains that: 
 
 a sentimentalist is simply one who desires to have the luxury of an emotion without 
paying for it.  … We think we can have our emotions for nothing.  We cannot.  
Even the finest and the most self-sacrificing emotions have to be paid for.  Strangely 
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enough, that is what makes them fine.  The intellectual and emotional life of ordinary 
people is a very contemptible affair. … they always try to get their emotions on 
credit, or refuse to pay the bill when it comes in.  … Remember that the 
sentimentalist is always a cynic at heart.  Indeed sentimentality is merely the bank 
holiday of cynicism. [Wilde 1897, 636 & 640] 
 
The occasion that led Oscar Wilde to this remark was one where an emotion was literally 
going to cost money:  Lord Douglas wanted to be considerate to his mother by not asking 
her for financial support, but at the same time he was unwilling to do without any of his 
wonted luxury and extravagance.  So he sponged on Wilde instead, which made his gesture 
towards his mother hollow —: ‘To propose to spare your mother’s pocket was beautiful.  To 
do so at my expense was ugly’ (Wilde 1897, 636).  He indulged in feeling beautifully unselfish 
at the time, but he wasn’t really  
 Or wasn’t he?  The fact remains that Lord Douglas spared his mother’s money, 
which might well have been an act of sincere affection, even if in the end it didn’t cost him 
much.  It wasn’t a heroic self-sacrifice, but, for all we know, it could still have been a sincere 
act of kindness.  But let us assume that Lord Douglas did revel in the feeling of a grand self-
effacing deed, which his act did not in fact amount to.  Is that, then, a paradigmatic case of 
sentimentality?  In other words, is sentimentality a matter of having, perhaps indulging in, 
the feelings of an emotion, while shrinking from the behavioural consequences that emotion, 
if genuine, would require (— refusing to pay the bill)? 
 I am not entirely sure that such ineffectuality of feeling should be called 
sentimentality.  Suppose I feel passionately in love with a girl, but then refuse to do anything 
for her when she needs help.  Obviously, it wasn’t love, only a passing fancy, but it seems 
less clear whether it should be described as sentimentality.  Or think of somebody who 
listening to another’s tales of misfortune, witnessing their dire straits, feels touched and eager 
to help, promises to do so, as soon as possible — but, somehow, never does.  That person’s 
intention to help, though quite sincere and heartfelt at the time, does not prove strong 
enough to last and to lead to action.  Is this a case of sentimentality, or is it not more aptly 
called shallowness? (which Oscar Wilde calls ‘the supreme vice’, and of which, incidentally, 
he also accuses Lord Douglas (Wilde 1897, 580)). 
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 Moreover, there are clear cases of sentimentalists that are not lacking in real action.  
An elderly lady that gets soppy about cats may spend all her money on trying to improve 
their lives.  And, as Michael Tanner observes, sentimentality may lead to various forms of 
violent behaviour, even suicide (Tanner 1977, 131).   
 Nonetheless, Michael Tanner regards those remarks, from De Profundis, as Oscar 
Wilde’s most profound observation.  As he puts it, ‘a dominant element in sentimentality is 
that the feelings which constitute it are in some important way unearned, being had on the 
cheap, come by too easily’ (Tanner 1977, 128).  Yet this is not exactly the case of Lord 
Alfred Douglas.  Wilde’s metaphor was that of not paying the bill after the luxury of an 
emotion; which suggests that the feeling was (or could have been) real enough at the time 
and only devalued subsequently by one’s refusal to face the consequences.  Whereas 
Tanner’s words suggest a slightly different picture: there is something wrong with one’s even 
having those feelings in the first place.  They are come by too easily, unearned, i.e.: it should 
have been more difficult to experience them. 
 The same metaphor is used by Roger Scruton who at one point calls ‘sentimentality’: 
‘the desire for the glory of some heroic or transfiguring passion, without the cost of feeling 
it’ (Scruton 2000, 86).  This may be the sentimentality of somebody longing for the ardour of 
religious belief, but unwilling seriously to engage with it.  In another context Scruton writes 
that: ‘Kitsch is an attempt to have the life of the spirit on the cheap’ (Scruton 1999). 
 I agree that there is some truth in this metaphor (of having feelings on the cheap), 
which I shall return to later.  For the moment, however, I want to point out that this idea of 
sentimentality as emotions on the cheap seems extremely inappropriate as a basis for literary 
criticism.  For is it not rather a neat characterisation of all fiction, including good literature, 
perhaps especially of well-crafted effective literature, that it gives us ‘emotions on the cheap’?  
Novels and plays allow us imaginatively to live through and respond to all types of human 
passion or suffering, in a well-controlled and risk-free manner:  without the inconvenience of 
being overwhelmed, traumatised, actually ruined or killed by the real thing.  That it affords 
us emotions on the cheap is the very beauty and attraction of fiction, fiction at its best; — 
not a defect called ‘sentimentality’. 
 Here we encounter the second stage of arguing that sentimentality in literature is a 
moral flaw: transferring the moral objections to sentimentality in a person to a work of 
fiction.  One natural way of making this move is this:  A person is sentimental if he has 
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certain kinds of emotions; a work of fiction is sentimental if it is likely to evoke in you that 
kind of emotion.  But if sentimentality is emotions on the cheap, then on this account all 
emotional fiction comes out as sentimental, which is absurd. 
 Of course, this is not the only way of making the move from person to artefact.  It 
may be more plausible to say that sentimental fiction expresses sentimentality, rather than 
arousing it.  But even so, the characterisation of sentimentality as emotions on the cheap 
faces a problem.  For it means that, even if we don’t regard the literature itself as 
sentimental, it would still appear that all appreciative readers are.  Reading fiction with the 
appropriate emotional sensitivity is undoubtedly a cheap and convenient way of enriching 
your emotional life.  So on this account, reading fiction or watching it on the stage would be 
indulging in sentimentality, or shallowness.  Leaving the theatre or putting the book aside we 
leave those borrowed feelings behind; just as Bingo Little (in P.G. Wodehouse’s Jeeves novels) 
is passionately in love one moment and forgets all about it the next. 
 
 
II. 
Let us now consider Anthony Savile’s analysis of sentimentality as a moral failing.  According to 
Savile, sentimentality is always reprehensible because it involves an element of self-
deception:  A sentimentalist falsifies certain aspects of his experience, idealizing them, ‘under 
the guidance of a desire for gratification and reassurance’ (Savile 1982, 241).  That is, either 
in order to experience an agreeable emotional response, or in order to experience an 
emotion that, although perhaps not pleasant in itself, allows one to feel good about oneself, 
or a combination of both.   
 A common example is the sentimentalization of children and domestic pets: 
‘Projecting onto them an exaggerated vulnerability and innocence, I encourage myself to feel 
a tender compassion for them’, which is pleasant, but also supports ‘a view of myself as a 
man of gentleness and fine feeling’ (Savile 1982, 239). 
 An example exclusively of the second type is this: ‘a man who idealizes a distant 
political cause may be sentimentally angry or indignant when one of its exponents is 
extradited from the country, even though he does not experience these feelings with 
pleasure’.  The point is rather that they ‘enable him to take a gratifying view of his own 
character’ (Savile 1982, 239-40). 
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 A first objection to Savile’s analysis is that it takes extreme, quasi pathological cases 
as the paradigm of sentimentality.  This is comparable to making violent behaviour a 
defining feature of alcoholism.  It is of course true that many, and perhaps very typical, cases 
of alcohol addiction involve violent behaviour; but obviously not all.  Similarly, Savile’s 
examples of self-deception are undoubtedly telling specimens of sentimentality, but it’s easy 
to come up with more benign instances of sentimentality that do not involve any self-
deception or falsification.  Imagine somebody who takes great delight at the sight of cuddly 
little animals; who is in raptures when seeing a mother cat licking her kitten; and who is 
inordinately fond of their own cat and extremely concerned about its comforts.  Such a 
person is sentimental about their cat, but need not for that matter be deceived or self-
deceiving about cats’ nature and limited intelligence.  Or again, I may be a lover of romantic 
comedies and particularly relish the touching moments at the end when all is bliss and 
happiness.  That, no doubt, would betoken a sentimental streak in me, but it doesn’t make 
me guilty of any kind of idealizing self-deception.  I may be well aware that things are rarely 
as neat and tidy as that in real life.  Indeed, that may be the very reason why I’m so keen on 
romantic fiction: that it’s more beautiful than real life. 
 Savile distorts the concept of sentimentality by defining it in terms of its — 
admittedly typical, but not inevitable — excesses.  And what is more, even those excesses 
may not always deserve Savile’s harsh censure.  There are many cat or dog lovers whose 
fondness of their pets makes them entertain a somewhat idealized picture of those animals’ 
feelings and intelligence.  You like to believe, for example, that your cat has some personal 
attachment to you, in the way people do; — which is clearly an illusion.  But is such a 
sentimental idealization morally reprehensible?  Think of a lonely old woman who has 
nobody to talk to but her cat:  Is she morally wrong to cultivate this kind of sentimental self-
deception of thinking of her cat as listening to her? — It seems to me that such common 
instances of sentimentality are usually quite harmless, since they remain well localised: you 
please yourself with entertaining the idea of your cat’s perceptiveness, but you never actually 
make a fool of yourself by expecting your cat to do anything intelligent (fetch the post, or 
make a telephone call).  And in some cases such mildly self-deceiving sentimentality may be 
of considerable psychological benefit. 
 Finally, there is the question of how Savile’s analysis is to be transferred from a 
sentimental person to a sentimental piece of fiction.  There are, of course, idealizing 
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representations in fiction.  But what about the idea of self-deception?  Would authors have 
to deceive themselves in order to produce a sentimental piece of fiction?  Surely not.  We 
would criticize a novel as sentimental even if it was obvious that the author knew perfectly 
well what he was doing; say, as somebody who makes a living out of producing cheap fiction 
according to familiar patterns.  So it would be more plausible to say that sentimental fiction 
contains falsifying idealizations, while the effect of emotional gratification or reassurance 
would have to be located in the intended reader, not necessarily the author. 
 This is a point developed by Mary Midgley, who agrees with Savile that 
sentimentality consists in ‘misrepresenting the world in order to indulge our feelings’.  And 
in fiction such misrepresentation is calculated to indulge the readers’ feelings; which is 
reprehensible because ‘it distorts expectation; it can make people unable to deal with the real 
world’ (Midgley 1979, 385).   
 But is that a plausible complaint? — Don Quichote springs to mind: whose long 
exposure to romantic literature and seclusion from the world made him mistake windmills 
for dangerous giants.  But then, the conceit of Cervantes’ novel is more satirical than 
realistic.  In fact, people are not as naïve as that; they have a fairly good understanding of the 
institutional concept of fiction as something that is not intended to be taken at face value (cf. 
Jefferson 1983; Newman 1995).  Indeed, misrepresentation of the world is understood to be 
a key device of many literary genres, such as fairy tale, fantasy, or science fiction.  Of course 
there are also genres that aim for thoroughgoing realism.  But then, that is understood to be 
an artistic challenge, which readers are invited to judge as more or less successfully met, by 
drawing on their knowledge of the real world.  Readers admire a realistic novel if they find 
that it is true to life in all its psychological details; they do not take it for granted that that is 
always the case.  (And if they did, they would not be sentimental in Savile’s sense: they would 
not be self-deceiving, but merely mistaken.) 
 If we consider an unrealistically sentimental description in literature, for example, 
some angelically virtuous and well-behaved children in Charles Dickens’s novels, it is rather 
difficult to imagine how an adult reader might be deceived by such a description so as to 
expect all children to be like that. You would have to imagine someone who has never seen 
any real children in his life. 
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III. 
In sum, I am not convinced by the view that sentimentality is a moral failing, a reprehensible 
falsification, as Savile claims, so that sentimentality in literature too would be morally 
reprehensible.  What then is sentimentality, and is there anything wrong with it?   
 Robert Solomon, in his ‘Defense of Sentimentality’, asserts that sentimentality is 
‘nothing more nor less than the “appeal to tender feelings”’, and denies boldly that there is 
anything wrong with it, either in people or in literature (Solomon 1990, 305).  I think that is 
going too far.  It may not be the grave moral defect that Savile, Midgley and others make it 
out to be, but it isn’t all fine either.  In many uses of the word ‘sentimental’ (where it isn’t 
merely used to mean: ‘having to do with tender emotions’), it serves as a pejorative term.  
Sentimentality is a tendency to have and express tender feelings; but the word also carries an 
implication that those feelings or expressions are a bit over the top: excessive relative to the 
circumstances.  A woman’s grief over the death of her child, for example, would not be called 
sentimental, as it is clearly not excessive, but fully appropriate, to feel and express such grief, 
even very loudly and openly. 
 In short: sentimentality is an excessive tendency to have and express tender feelings.  
That means, the sentimentalist tends to seek out occasions for tender feelings; tends to have a 
lower threshold for having tender feelings; and tends to prolong the experience, to savour it fully 
and revel in it.  Sentimentality cherry-picks suitable objects at which to direct beautiful 
feelings, and makes a meal out of it. 
 If this is correct, it is easy to see how sentimentality, although it is not intrinsically a 
falsifying attitude (cherry-picking, but not falsifying), can lead to the kind of misperception 
or misrepresentation described by Savile.  If you are on the look out for suitable objects at 
which to direct your tender feelings, and if you have an excessive desire to find some, it is 
very likely that you cut some corners: that you eke out things in your imagination, or 
carefully overlook certain unsuitable details, in order to find what you’re looking for.  
 Sometimes there is a grey area between convenient ignorance and self-deception.  
When after her fatal accident people got sentimental over Princess Diana, the ready object of 
their tender feelings was only her public persona: pretty and nice.  Better knowledge of the 
real person might have made it more difficult to mourn her like a saint.  Some, in this case, 
may have manipulated their image of her to suit their feelings, but others would simply not 
have been aware of more of her than those lovable innocent features.  Their intense 
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sympathetic response might still be censured as excessive (after all they had never met her) 
and naive, but it wouldn’t involve any active falsification. 
 Compare the sentimentalist (who enjoys strong sympathetic feelings) with other 
types of people with a penchant for certain kinds for experience (as usefully listed by Mark 
Jefferson (1983)), such as:  
 the thrill seeker;  
 the melodramatic man (who enjoys and likes to emphasise the poignant and dramatic 
aspects of situations);  
 or the wondrous man (who delights in the mysterious). 
What they all have in common is a predilection for a certain kind of experience, which they 
seek out to an extent that others find excessive.  And in all these cases there is a danger of 
self-deception: of pretending to be in a suitable situation for the desired emotion, when in 
fact that is not so.  The thrill seeker may exaggerate to himself the danger of the situation he 
is in; the melodramatic man overstates and inflates the dramatic aspects of a situation; the 
wondrous man may project something mysterious into ordinary coincidences; and the 
sentimentalist may be tempted to deceive himself in order to indulge his tender feelings.  But 
then again, they all may resist the temptation to cheat and find some honest gratification for 
their temperaments.  The world is full of real dangers for thrill seekers; there is occasionally 
real drama in human relations; real mystery in scientific research; and certainly plenty of 
appropriate occasions for sympathetic feelings.   None of these types is, as such, a self-
deceiver; just as a drug addict is not a thief, even though drug addicts may often be likely to 
become thieves. 
 Let us now reconsider Oscar Wilde’s idea that sentimentality means having emotions 
on the cheap.  If sentimentality is an inclination to cherry-pick and dwell upon suitable 
objects of tender emotions, it will typically go for easy options.  That is to say, trying to gratify 
a sentimentalist temperament you will naturally prefer clear-cut, straightforward simple cases, 
of thoroughly good, innocent creatures, where you can wholeheartedly sympathise, pity or 
rejoice.  That is the sentimentalist’s emotional taste: strong pure feelings, without any 
distracting admixtures or confusing complications (such as victims that are far from innocent 
and lovable; or good deeds done from selfish motives).  And that, it seems to me, is what 
may strike us as ‘cheap’ about a sentimentalist’s feelings.  It is cheap and easy to sympathise 
extensively with innocent and lovable victims of evil villains.  It is a lot more demanding to 
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sort out one’s feelings in less clear-cut cases.  There is nothing morally wrong with the 
sentimentalist’s preference for easy options; it may however appear a little immature, lacking 
in emotional sophistication.  Thus, to call it cheap is probably more an aesthetic criticism. 
 Finally, the charge of sentimentality in literary criticism should certainly be seen as an 
aesthetic censure and not as a moral, or ethically motivated, one.  It is implausible to hold 
that the aficionado of fairy tales or simple-minded romances fails to notice the unrealistic 
idealizations.  It is rather a taste for simple-minded narratives involving pure good and evil, 
which neither real life experience nor realistic fiction can satisfy.  Such a taste is not morally 
reprehensible, though we may find it rather crude and primitive.  To more sophisticated, 
adult, literary interests, sentimental fiction is just boring (at least from a psychological point 
of view).  It is more interesting, hence aesthetically more effective, to have psychologically 
less clear-cut and more complicated cases: where, for example, the suffering is not of an all-
noble hero or a blue-eyed innocent girl, but of somebody with a more realistically mixed and 
warped character. 
 However, if I am right in thinking that the word ‘sentimental’ is used in this context 
as a pejorative term, it should be noted that not every stylized or idealized representation in 
literature should be called sentimental.  Dickens’s A Christmas Carol, for instance, is not 
meant to be realistic.  It is a fairy tale, and in this genre simplified and idealized 
characterizations (such as those of the Cratchit family) are aesthetically quite appropriate.  
The death of little Nell (in The Old Curiosity Shop), by contrast, is certainly sentimental by our 
standards of a realist novel, though was perhaps less so in Victorian times.   
 It is worth noting that if ‘sentimental’ means excessive in expressing tender feelings, 
sentimentality must be relative, first, to the cultural standards of expressing one’s feelings in 
a given society, and secondly, to the standards of literary taste, which may allow for genres 
that are self-consciously stylised and artificial, both linguistically and psychologically. 
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